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Iterative and incremental mechanisms are not usually considered in existing approaches for information security management
System (ISMS). In this paper, we propose SUP (security unified process) as a unified process to implement a successful and high-
quality ISMS. A disciplined approach can be provided by SUP to assign tasks and responsibilities within an organization. The SUP
architecture comprises static and dynamic dimensions; the static dimension, or disciplines, includes business modeling, assets,
security policy, implementation, configuration and change management, and project management. The dynamic dimension, or
phases, contains inception, analysis and design, construction, andmonitoring. Risk assessment is a major part of the ISMS process.
In SUP, we present a risk assessment model, which uses a fuzzy expert system to assess risks in organization. Since, the classification
of assets is an important aspect of risk management and ensures that eﬀective protection occurs, a Security Cube is proposed
to identify organization assets as an asset classification model. The proposed model leads us to have an oﬄine system health
monitoring tool that is really a critical need in any organization.
1. Introduction
Information security is a primary requirement in today’s
communication world. These requirements are driven either
by business need or by regulations. Many organizations find
it diﬃcult to derive a framework to define those require-
ments. In most cases, information has become the vital
“asset” of businesses and is called “information asset” or
“intellectual asset” [1]. It is essential to protect this asset
so as to ensure its confidentiality, integrity, and availability
[2]. While preserving these essential protections, the right
information should be available to the right people, at the
right place and at the right time. It is expected to make
the information secure to guarantee that it is correct and
available.
Also, it can be guaranteed that information is not jeop-
ardized by misuse, which could lead to the loss of business
and low performance of regulations. Obviously, information
security management plays a very important and crucial
role in each organization. The organization is expected to
follow certain security compliance regulations and standards,
together with the implementation of an information secu-
rity management infrastructure. Therefore, an appropriate
information security infrastructure, which is a vital need
for most organizations, must be provided and implemented.
Information security standards are helping organizations at
this stage. There are many standards available for deriving
a framework to define and structure the organization’s
requirements. As an example, one of the most applicable
standards is ISO27001, which is an ISO accredited stan-
dard for information security management [2]. There are
several reasons why an organization should implement the
ISO27001 standard and the primary one will be the business
demand [3].
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Many organizations have introduced an ISMS to improve
their security information management but always have big
challenges to align goals of ISMS with their native security
structure [4]. There are diﬀerent ways of implementing an
ISMS, but they are unable to implement it eﬀectively and
cannot keep it continuously within the organization. In this
paper, a framework is proposed to cover ISO27001 and
ISO17799 in such a manner that roles for all of the personnel
in the organization are defined and each role has been
assigned to predefined tasks. Also, each role has a specific
workflow which is also defined in the framework. On the
other hand and contrary to the ISO27001 standard which
uses a waterfall model of implementation, in this proposed
framework we will explore incremental and iterative mech-
anisms to implement an ISMS. Also, while implementing
the ISMS, the proposed framework can figure out the status
of the executed sections that makes the implementation
eﬀective.
This paper is organized as follows: first, we discuss related
work and several existing methods. The proposed model is
illustrated in Section 3. In Section 4, experimental results are
presented. Conclusion and future work will be discussed in
Section 5.
2. Related Work
2.1. Information Security Management System. Information
security means protecting information and information
systems [5]. Protection concept refers to the unauthorized
access, disruption or, etc. Usually, the attacker exploits
security goals (CIA): data confidentiality (C), data integrity
(I), and service availability (A) using vulnerabilities that are
a flaw or weak point in system security procedure, design,
or implementation. Data confidentiality ensures that any
authorized user can have access to only certain resources
such as “information in database,” “system configuration,”
and “network topology” which are needed to be protected
against inappropriate disclosures. Integrity verifies that any
authorized user can modify resources in an acceptable man-
ner. Availability means that the assets are always accessible
by the authorized users. An information security man-
agement system consists of some policies concerned with
information security management. ISO/IEC 27001 standard
gives overview of information security management systems.
The key point in implementing ISMS is that it must
remain eﬀective and eﬃcient over time. Thus, ISO/IEC
27001 standard incorporates Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA)
cycle to keep long-term eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency and
adopt information systems changes [2]. PDCA is an iterative
four-step management method. Unfortunately, a problem
still occurs in the implementation of ISMS with PDCA; all
activities scheduled in the Plan phase are only performed
later in the Do phase. ISMS implementation experiences in
the past few years indicate that the proposed method has still
not reached full maturity and could not ensure that ISMS
remains eﬀective and stable over time. Indeed, it emerged
as a nonincremental method. The proposed algorithm not
only keeps the iterative nature of the PDCA model but also
manages all activities incrementally.
2.2. Risk Assessment. Risk assessment is a major part of
the ISMS Process. There are two types of risk assessment:
(1) online: online risk assessment is a real-time process of
evaluation and provides a risk index related to the host
or network. Online risk assessment is very important in
terms of minimizing the performance cost incurred. In the
dynamic model, we can dynamically evaluate attack cost
by propagating the impact of confidentiality, integrity and
availability through dependencies model or attack graph [6–
12]. (2) Oﬄine: in Information security management system
we use oﬄine risk assessment. The information security
management system standards specify guidelines and a
general framework for risk assessment. In many existing
standards, such as NIST and ISO27001, risk assessment
is described. However, while these standards present some
guidelines, there are no details on how to implement it in
an organization. In a complex organization, risk assessment
is a complicated process which involves many assets.
Guan et al. [13] assessed information security risks
according to the likelihood and impact factors of each.
In this method, risk factors are determined according to
standard ISO17799 categorization. Then, it is assumed
that determining the likelihood of each risk is similar to
determining the weights in pairwise comparisons in the AHP
method. Based on this view, the likelihood or weight of each
risk factor is being determined using experts’ opinions. On
the other hand, the vulnerability of each information asset
for each risk factor is considered equal to its impact severity,
which takes its relative value from experts through linguistic
variables.
Wang and Elhag [14] proposed a fuzzy TOPSIS method
based on alpha level sets and applied it in bridge risk
assessment. In this example, the likelihood and impact of
diﬀerent threats are being determined in linguistic variable
forms and then are applied in bridge risk assessment by
multiplying their related fuzzy values. Likewise, four eﬀective
criteri on impact severity are introduced. Experts express
their opinion in the form of these four criterion, with which
the severity impact is then calculated.
Kondakci [15] presented a composite system used for
quantitative network security assessment. The idea is pre-
venting the evaluation of each asset separately by applying
repetitive attacks. The proposed model (composite system)
generates and executes attacks once, composes risk data, and
uses the risk data for the entire network in order to perform
the overall assessment.
We agree with the arguments presented in [15, 16]
that existing risk assessment models are often diﬃcult
to implement and handle in real world contexts without
using appropriate software, because of their computational
complexity. We are interested as [15, 16] to oﬀer a model that
not only tries to represent risk eﬀect with a quantitative value
but also can be easily implemented by any organization in the
SUP model. Another important point is that all of the steps
of proposed risk assessment are managed in SUP structure
incrementally and iteratively.
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2.3. Contribution. The main contributions of this paper can
be summarized as (1) contrary to the ISO27001 standard
which uses a waterfall model of implementation, in this
proposed framework we will explore incremental and iter-
ative mechanisms to implement an information security
management system. The iterative approach can prevent
project failure and cause robust implementation of security
goals in the last iteration. (2) Role segregation has not been
considered in ISO27001 standard and other security models
properly. SUP proposes an appropriate role segregation and
makes sure that we establish a framework where we can easily
segregate security roles, and responsibilities. Roles have been
segregated into about 20 roles and in each phase of SUP, it is
clear which activities have to be done by each role and which
artifacts have to be generated. (3) Since the proposed model
is incremental and iterative, one of the important features of
SUP is monitoring. Monitoring ensures that we established
a framework to monitor roles, responsibilities, new assets,
security policies and continuity of the executive committee
of the organization. (4) In SUP, we present the FEMRA
(fuzzy expert model for risk assessment) model, which uses
a fuzzy expert system for risk assessment in organizations.
Many risk assessment models have been proposed during
the last decade. The distinguishing feature that separates our
model from previous models is that all the steps to assess
risk are done incrementally and iteratively based on the SUP
structure. (5) To determine the risk, eﬀective criterions are
considered, and experts present their opinion with respect
to these criterions. It leads us to increased accuracy and
reliability of the results. (6) Asset classification plays a very
important role in information security management. In
the proposed risk assessment, we have designed a security
cube (an asset classification), which is a combination of the
valuable and important assets of the organization from a
security perspective.
3. Proposed Model
SUP is an iterative and incremental approach that can
help design, implement, monitor, and manage information
security management system. This approach provides any
organization with a predictable life-cycle security process for
the development, adoption, and continual improvement of
the information security solution [17]. Several fundamental
principles which support successful iterative development
are laid at the core of the SUP and represent the essential
structure of the SUP [18, 19].
(i) Classify the assets with the proposed security cube.
(ii) Identify high risks early and manage continuously.
(iii) Work as a team.
(iv) Improve quality of implementation over time.
(v) Implement a modular ISMS with components.
3.1. Why Develop Iteratively and Incrementally? In the water-
fall method, the biggest problem is that risk management
will be reduced whenever the business model, assets iden-
tification, threats, and/or vulnerabilities are not perfectly
known. Another problem of the waterfall method for the
implementation of an ISMS is that the strategies of future
phases are not considered before they are started. The
initial idea behind developing an ISMS iteratively is that, in
contrast with the waterfall implementation, the developer
is allowed to take advantage of what was learned during
the development of earlier, incremental, deliverable versions
of security levels within the organization. Learning comes
from both the development and reaching the security levels,
where possible. Risks are mitigated earlier, because elements
are integrated progressively. We can accommodate changing
the requirements in this method. We can facilitate the ISMS
improvement and refinement which results in more robust
ISMS. An iterative approach is generally superior to a linear
or waterfall approach for many diﬀerent reasons [20].
In the security unified process, iterations are planned
in number, duration, and objective. A proper assessment of
objectives enables the move to the next iteration successfully.
The iterative approach can prevent project failure and cause
robust implementation of security goals in the last iteration.
3.2. Structure of the SUP. As seen in Figure 1, the pro-
posed information security management model includes
two dimensions: static, which are disciplines, and dynamic,
which are phases. In this architecture, the static dimension
comprises six disciplines that are represented by business
modeling, asset, security policy, implementation, configura-
tion and change management, and project management. The
dynamic dimension contains four life-cycle phases that are
illustrated by inception, analysis and design, construction,
and monitoring. Also, each phase can iterate. The area under
the curve that is associated with each discipline shows the
relative amount of eﬀort and activity required to perform it
over time. Along the vertical axis are the disciplines, which
are a collection of workflows related to a major area of
concern within the overall project [17, 18]. Figure 2 presents
asset discipline.
A workflow consists of some activities that produce a
result of observable value. Figure 3 presents, identifies and
analyzes risk workflow. As seen in Figure 3, in each workflow,
we have some roles, activities, and artifacts that are integrated
to provide the goal of workflow. Table 1 explains each
concept of elements in workflows. As mentioned, role
segregation has not been considered in ISO27001 standard
and other security models properly. SUP proposes an
appropriate role segregation andmakes sure that we establish
a framework where we can easily segregate security roles
and responsibilities. As mentioned, Figure 3 illustrates one
of the SUP model workflow, that are relevant to the asset
discipline. Roles segregation is clearly shown in this workflow
that includes eleven roles: threat evaluator, network specialist,
network security specialist, communication specialist, computer
specialist, network designer specialist, vulnerabilities evaluator,
software specialist, information security specialist, physical
security specialist, and human resource analyzer. Six activities
have been specified, and in fact each role is responsible
to perform the related subactivities. Also, all the artifacts
(output of activities) should be updated, and each role has
to keep updated the related sections of each artifact. Fifteen
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Phases
Disciplines
Business modeling
Asset
Security policy
Implementation
Configuration and change
management
Project management
Inception Analysis and des. Construction Monitoring
I1 AD1 AD2 C1 C2 Cn M1
Figure 1: SUP architecture (phases: dynamic dimension; disciplines: static dimension).
artifacts are shown as the input artifacts that are generated in
the previous workflows.
3.3. Milestones. From a security management perspective,
all security life cycles of SUP are decomposed into four
phases, and each phase is concluded by a major milestone.
These milestones are represented by inception objectives,
risk management, security level, and monitoring milestones.
In each milestone, there are some major criteria that must
be evaluated to determine whether the objectives of the
phase have been met or not. These criteria are the phases
objectives that must be reached. For instance, at the security-
level milestone, the primary evaluation criteria for the
construction phase involves the answers to these questions.
(i) Is the security level acceptable?
(ii) Are the identified risks reduced?
The construction phase may be started again if it fails to
reach this milestone. A positive assessment shows that the
project can be moved to the next phase successfully. Figure 4
shows the phases and milestones of a security management
project at each phase end.
3.4. Phases, Objectives, and Activities. The inception phase
is the first security project phase. In this phase, an accurate
identification of the organization’s business model as well
as an asset identification is performed. The most important
objectives in this phase that must be met and evaluated are.
(i) agreement that the cost/schedule estimates are appro-
priate.
(ii) agreement that the right set of security requirements
have been obtained and that there is a common
understanding of these requirements.
(iii) agreement that the identified assets are acceptable.
(iv) agreement that the defined risk assessment and
management methodology is appropriate.
(v) formation of the executive committee of the organi-
zation.
Table 2 describes the activities during the inception phase
of the SUP. During the analysis and Design phase, the
analysis of assets to identify vulnerability points, threat
points, and eventually risks is a vital step. During this phase,
the most important objectives which need to be evaluated are
as follows.
Activities of the Inception Phase
(i) Agreement that the classified assets are acceptable.
(ii) All risks have been identified, and a mitigation
strategy exists for each.
(iii) Risks have been identified in accordance with the risk
assessment and management methodology.
(iv) The designed system is in accordance with the
identified risks.
(v) Agreement that the designed system reduces risks.
(vi) Writing the security policy.
Table 3 describes the activities of the analysis and design
phase of the SUP. The construction phase focuses on
implementing the designs resulting in risks reduction within
an organization. Implementing the designs is based on a
workflow that is extracted from the analysis and design
phase. This workflow shows that a design can be started
based on design priority. If we treat the base on design
priority, the risks are reduced to an acceptable level. In SUP,
security levels based on design priority are divided in five
levels. On the other hand, the construction phase consists of
five iterations. At the end of each iteration, the organization
will reach a new security level. During this phase, the most
important objectives that must be evaluated are as follows.
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Identify
human assets
Identify
logical assets
Identify
physical assets
Identify risk assessment strategy
Analyze asset
Classify asset
Identify and analyze risk
Plan risks elimination
Prioritize designs
Design
human security
Design
logical security
Design
physical security
Monitor assets
Figure 2: Asset discipline.
(i) Is the security level acceptable?
(ii) Are the identified risks reduced?
(iii) Agreement that the security level is acceptable.
Table 4 illustrates the activities of the SUP construc-
tion phase. During the monitoring phase, a monitoring
program should be planned. The monitoring scope is the
identification of new assets, vulnerabilities, and threats
in asset discipline, reviewing the security policies in the
security policy discipline and testing the implementations in
the implementation discipline. The project manager must
organize specific roles to ensure the ISMS eﬀectiveness.
During this phase, the most important objectives that must
be evaluated are as follows.
(i) testing the implementation to keep the security at an
acceptable level,
(ii) agreement that major risks do not exist.
Table 5 represents the activities of the SUP monitoring
phase. ISO17799 includes eleven sections with 134 controls.
Afterwards, ISO27001 has been developed as a wrapper
to be put around ISO17799 to manage it with a PDCA
model. By contrast, the SUP model comprises disciplines,
workflows, and activities. Based on our structure, ISO17799
is mapped to the activities of the six disciplines and ISO27001
is mapped to the workflows of the six disciplines. Therefore,
the percentage of project progress can easily be measured
based on these two standards for each stage of the ISMS
implementation project when using the SUP framework.
3.5. Risk Assessment. In SUP, we present the FEMRA (fuzzy
expert model for risk assessment) model [21], which uses
a fuzzy expert system for risk assessment in organizations.
The risk assessment varies considerably with the context, the
metrics used as dependent variables, and the opinions of the
persons involved. Fuzzy logic thus represents an excellent
model for this application. Organizations can use FEMRA
as a tool to improve the ISMS implementation. One of the
interesting characteristics of FEMRA is that it can represent
each risk with a numerical value. The managers can detect
higher risks by comparing these values and develop a good
strategy to reduce them [22]. The relevant knowledge from
human experts is stored as rule database in order to apply
fuzzy logic and infer an overall numerical value [23]. There
are three steps in the fuzzy model: fuzzification, inference
engine, and defuzzification. The input and output of the
fuzzy model is a number. In the inference engine, we define
fuzzy rules. The first step in fuzzy logic processing involves
a domain transformation called fuzzification. To transform
crisp input into fuzzy input, membership functions must
first be defined.
The next step is to apply if-then rules. The final step
is defuzzification. This step is used to convert the fuzzy
output set to a crisp number. We define three membership
functions for input and output: low, medium, and high.
Figure 5 illustrates the dependencies among some of the
most important notions in the risk assessment terminology.
There are three steps in the risk assessment model.
Step 1. The goal of the first step is to identify the assets
and the potential threats applicable to the IT system.
Three main bases of security known as the security golden
triangle (confidentiality, integrity and availability) are used
to evaluate assets, and calculate threat eﬀects. Therefore, in
this step, we have the CIA triad evaluated by experts.
Step 2. The goal of this step is to generate a list of
asset vulnerabilities. We can then calculate asset values,
vulnerability eﬀects and threat eﬀects.
Step 3. The goal of the final step is to calculate the risks. To
calculate these eﬀects, we use the fuzzy model that will be
explained.
Algorithm 1 illustrates the proposed risk assessment
pseudocode.
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Software
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New
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Calculate
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Calculate
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risk
assessment
Security golden
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Physical asset
(qualitative analysis)
Logical asset
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Figure 3: Identify and analyze risk workflow.
Inception Construction Monitoring
Inception Risk Security- Monitoring
objectives
milestone milestone
management level
milestone
milestone
Analysis and
design
Figure 4: The phases and milestones of SUP.
3.5.1. Asset Classification and Identification. Asset classifi-
cation plays a very important role in information security
management. So far, some methods have been proposed to
classify the assets in organizations. If we can classify assets
properly, it will help us achieve eﬀective asset protection. In
the proposed asset classification, we have designed a security
cube, which is a combination of the valuable and important
assets of the organization from a security perspective, and the
Zachman model [24]. Assets are classified according to three
views.
(i) Business View. The business view consists of the three
views of the Zachman framework (WHY-HOW-
WHO), which includes value, policy, vision, mis-
sion, strategy, structure, process, partner, cooperator,
internal rule, external rule, role, and human. There
are also some empty fields that illustrate the flexibility
of the model; some other parameters can be added to
the cube.
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Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Asset identification Threat identification
Vulnerability
identification
Vulnerability
eﬀect
Risk eﬀect
Asset value Threat eﬀect
Risk identification
CIA triad evaluation
Figure 5: FEMRA risk assessment structure.
(ii) Logical View. The logical view is divided into three
sections that are software, data, and logical infras-
tructure of networks. The data section is the WHAT
view of the Zachman framework. The software
section also is divided into foreign, country, and
organization parts. Each part includes network tools,
web application, application, programming, utility,
DBMS, OS, and oﬃce. The data section is divided
into personal and organizational parts, and each
part comprises DB, file, paper, and brain storage.
In the network section, the six parts are platform,
application, strategy, protocol, communication, and
design. Each part also includes diﬀerent parameters
that are illustrated in Figure 6.
(iii) Physical View. The physical view consists of four
sections: media, storage, WHERE, and hardware
components. The WHERE section is used as the
WHERE view of the Zachman framework.
Each item in the cube should be evaluated with the
four disciplines of SUP. This means that, when we are in
the business modeling discipline, our view of each item is
diﬀerent than that from other disciplines. Additionally, in
each discipline, each item should be evaluated with a C-I-A
triad. Table 6 presents some examples of assets based on the
security cube.
3.5.2. Threat Identification. A threat is something which
may happen. When a threat materializes, it may result in
unwanted events which could damage the system or organi-
zation [2]. Threats can adversely aﬀect assets. Table 7 shows
some examples of threats.
3.5.3. CIA Triad Evaluation. Evaluating the CIA triad is key
to calculate the organization’s risks, and we can determine
which one of these three complimentary goals is more
important to an organization. The weight of confidentiality
(C), integrity (I), and availability (A) are denoted as wC , wI ,
and wA, respectively. We use n experts (e) to evaluate
the CIA triad. {Ce, Ie,Ae} ∈ [0, 1]. This illustrates the
expert opinion in confidentiality, integrity, and availability
respectively. Obviously, a higher number of experts would
give a better risk assessment. Finally, the base of the CIA triad
can be calculated with the following formula:
{Ce, Ie,Ae} ∈ [0, 1],
wC =
∑n
e=1 Ce
n
,
wI =
∑n
e=1 Ie
n
,
wA =
∑n
e=1 Ae
n
.
(1)
Table 8 illustrates the opinion of n experts about the CIA
triad for a hypothetical organization.
3.5.4. Vulnerability Identification. A vulnerability is a flaw or
weak point in system security procedures, design, or imple-
mentation. It could be exploited by an attacker or may
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Require: SGT = [C, I ,A] {Security-golden-triangle}
Require: E = [e1, e2, e3, . . . , en]{Experts}
1: Cube = [Business, Logical, Physical] {Security Cube}
2: Business = [Human]
3: Logical = [Foreign, Country, Organization, Personal, Organizational, Platform, Application, Strategy, Protocol,
Communication, Design]
4: Physical = [Media, Storage, Where, Hardware Component]
5: for each d ∈ Cube do
6: for each s ∈ d do
7: A = AssetIdentification(d, s){d: domains, s: sections}
8: end for
9: end for
10: T = ThreatIdentification() {Threat Identification T = [t1, t1, . . . , tn]}
11: Evaluation(E, SGT) {CIA Triad Evaluation}
12: for each a ∈ A do
13: V[a] = VulnerabilityIdentification(a) {Vulnerability Identification V = [v1, v2 . . . , vn]}
14: end for
15: R = RiskIdentification(A,V) {Risk Identification R = [r1, r2, . . . , rn]}
16: for each a ∈ A do
17: AV[a] = AssetValue(E, a) {Asset value}
18: end for
19: for each v ∈ V do
20: VE[v] = VulnerabilityEﬀect(E, v) {Vulnerability Eﬀect}
21: end for
22: for each t ∈ T do
23: TE[t] = ThreatEﬀect(E, t) {Threat Eﬀect}
24: end for
25: for each r ∈ R do
26: FRA = Fuzzification(r · a) {related asset}
27: FRV = Fuzzification(r · v) {related vulnerability}
28: FRT = Fuzzification(r · t) {related threat}
29: RE[r] = defuzzification(FRA, FRV, FRT)
30: end for
31: Return SRE = Sort(RE)
Algorithm 1: Risk assessment ().
Table 1: Workflow elements.
Symbol Name Description
Role
A role describes the responsibilities of person or a team in SUP. Role
uses artifacts to perform activities and also generates some artifacts.
Activity
Activity identifies the work that roles do to obtain meaningful results.
Activity has input and output artifacts.
 
Artifact
Artifact is a either final or intermediate product that is generated during
the project. Artifact may be: (1) A document such as list of threats or
vulnerabilities. (2) A model such as Risk Assessment Strategy
aﬀect the security goals of the CIA triad. Vulnerability
identification can be achieved by diﬀerent means such as
software tools in networks, questionnaire forms, and so forth
[23]. Table 9 presents some examples of asset vulnerabilities.
3.5.5. Risk Identification. The objective of risk identification
is to identify all possible risks to the assets. In the previous
sections, we exposed all the vulnerabilities of each asset. We
also exposed all threats to the organization’s assets. In this
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Figure 6: SUP cube.
Table 6: Assets.
ID Domain Section (sub) Asset
A1 Business view Who (human) John Smith
A2 Logical view (software) Organizational (app.) Human Resource Application
A3 Logical View (Data) Organizational (DB) SQL Server 1
A4 Logical view (network) Application (DNS) DNS 1
A5 Logical view (network) Design (VLAN) VLAN 1
A6 Physical view Hardware component (server room) Server Room 1
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Table 7: Threats.
ID Threat
T1 Cache poisoning attacks
T2 Data deletion
T3 SQL injection
T4 VLAN hopping attacks
T5 Earthquake
T6 Data theft
T7 Directory traversal
T8 Data discovery
T9 Physical theft
Table 8: CIA triad evaluation.
Expert Confidentiality (C) Integrity (I) Availability (A)
E1 c1 i1 a1
E2 c2 i2 a2
E3 c3 i3 a3
...
...
...
...
En cn in an
Weight wC wI wA
section, we determine which threats are related to which
vulnerability. The relationship between each vulnerability
and threat is a risk. Table 10 illustrates some risks within an
organization.
3.5.6. Asset Value (AV). The CIA triad should be used to
calculate the value of each asset. We use n experts to evaluate
each asset. To get better results, we should get help from
diﬀerent experts for each group of assets in the security
cube. For example, network experts should evaluate network
assets such as servers, clients, and firewalls, software experts
should evaluate software assets such as web applications.
Each expert assigns a value from one to nine to each part of
CIA triad based on Table 12. For example, a value of nine for
confidentiality means that this asset’s privacy is very high and
a value of one for availability means that the availability of
the asset is not important. Finally, the asset’s value could be
calculated with formula (2). AVC , AVI , and AVA illustrates
the calculation of asset value in confidentiality, integrity, and
availability, respectively. Table 11 shows the calculation of
asset value by n experts:
{Ce, Ie,Ae} ∈ [1, 9],
AVC = wC ·
(∑n
e=1 Ce
n
)
,
AVI = wI ·
(∑n
e=1 Ie
n
)
,
AVA = wA ·
(∑n
e=1 Ae
n
)
,
AV = AVC + AVI + AVA.
(2)
3.5.7. Vulnerability Eﬀect (VE). We represent vulnerability
eﬀects with a percentage, and, for better accuracy, we get
help from n experts. For example, 90% means a very high
vulnerability percentage, which means that all threats related
to this vulnerability have a high probability of occurring.
Finally, the vulnerability eﬀect could be calculated with
formula (3). Table 13 shows experts’ opinions for a given
vulnerability
VE =
∑n
e=1 eﬀect
n
. (3)
3.5.8. Threat Eﬀect (TE). We used the CIA triad to calculate
threat eﬀects. We use n experts to calculate those eﬀects. For
each threat, we should get help from relevant experts to get
better results. The calculation method of threats is similar to
the one for assets. Each expert assigns a value from one to
nine to each part of the CIA triad based on Table 11. For
example, a value of nine in confidentiality means that this
threat in the confidentiality area is very dangerous. Similarly,
the value one in availability means that this threat cannot be
dangerous for the availability. Finally, the threat eﬀects could
be calculated with formula (4). TEC , TEI , and TEA illustrates
the calculation of threat eﬀect in confidentiality, integrity,
and availability, respectively. Table 14 shows the calculation
of threat eﬀect by n experts:
{Ce, Ie,Ae} ∈ [1, 9],
TEC = wC ·
(∑n
e=1 Ce
n
)
,
TEI = wI ·
(∑n
e=1 Ie
n
)
,
TEA = wA ·
(∑n
e=1 Ae
n
)
,
TE = TEC + TEI + TEA.
(4)
3.5.9. Risk Eﬀect (RE). Risk eﬀects are modeled using three
parameters: asset values, vulnerability eﬀects, and threat
eﬀects. The following subsections will show how the risk
eﬀect can be calculated with the fuzzy model:
AV ∈ [1, 9],
VE ∈ [1, 100],
TE ∈ [1, 9],
RE = defuzz · (fuzz · (AV), fuzz · (VE), fuzz · (TE)).
(5)
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Table 9: Asset vulnerabilities.
ID Asset Vulnerability
V1 A1 (John Smith) No knowledge of file encoding using public keys
V2 A2 (Human Resource Application) Unchecked user input
V3 A3 (SQL Server 1) Not using a mixed authentication mode
V4 A4 (DNS 1) Insuﬃcient transaction ID space
V5 A5 (VLAN 1) Not properly configured
V6 A6 (Serve Room 1) Unsuitable location
Table 10: Some risks in an organization.
Asset ID Vulnerability ID Threat ID Risk ID
A1 V1 T9 R1
A2 V2 T3 R2
A2 V2 T7 R3
A3 V3 T2 R4
A3 V3 T6 R5
A3 V3 T8 R6
A4 V4 T1 R7
A5 V5 T4 R8
A6 V6 T5 R9
A6 V6 T9 R10
Table 11: Asset value.
Expert Confidentiality (C) Integrity (I) Availability (A)
E1 c1 i1 a1
E2 c2 i2 a2
E3 c3 i3 a3
...
...
...
...
En cn in an
Value AVC AVI AVA
Table 12: Range.
Level Level Eﬀect
High High 9
High Medium 8
High Low 7
Medium High 6
Medium Medium 5
Medium Low 4
Low High 3
Low Medium 2
Low Low 1
Table 13: Vulnerability Eﬀect.
Expert Eﬀect
E1 P1%
E2 P2%
E3 P3%
...
...
En Pn%
Eﬀect VE
Table 14: Threat eﬀect.
Expert Confidentiality (C) Integrity (I) Availability (A)
E1 c1 i1 a1
E2 c2 i2 a2
E3 c3 i3 a3
...
...
...
...
En cn in an
Eﬀect TEC TEI TEA
(i) Fuzzification. Three membership functions are used
for the three inputs, as can be seen in Figures 7(a),
7(b), and 7(c).
(ii) Inference Engine. The inference engine is fuzzy rule-
based and is used to map an input space to an output
space. The required rules for risk assessment are
created as:
Rule 1:
if (Threat Eﬀect = Low)
then Risk Eﬀect = Low
Rule 2:
if (Threat Eﬀect = Medium and Vulnerabil-
ity Eﬀect = Low)
then Risk Eﬀect = Low
Rule 3:
if (Threat Eﬀect = Medium and Vulnerabil-
ity Eﬀect = Medium)
then Risk Eﬀect = Low
Rule 4:
if (Threat Eﬀect = Medium and Vulnerabil-
ity Eﬀect = High)
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Figure 7: Three-level membership function.
then Risk Eﬀect = Medium
Rule 5:
if (Threat Eﬀect = High and Asset Value = Low)
then Risk Eﬀect = Medium
Rule 6:
if (Threat Eﬀect = High and Vulnerability Eﬀect
= Low and
Asset Value = Medium)
then Risk Eﬀect = Medium
Rule 7:
if (Threat Eﬀect = High and Vulnerability Eﬀect
= Medium and
Asset Value = Medium)
then Risk Eﬀect = Medium
Rule 8:
if (Threat Eﬀect = High and Vulnerability Eﬀect
= High and Asset Value = Medium)
then Risk Eﬀect = High
Rule 9:
if (Threat Eﬀect = High and Vulnerability Eﬀect
= Low and Asset Value = High)
then Risk Eﬀect = Medium
Rule 10:
if (Threat Eﬀect = High and Vulnerability Eﬀect
= Medium and Asset Value = High)
then Risk Eﬀect = High
Rule 11:
if (Threat Eﬀect = High and Vulnerability Eﬀect
= High and Asset Value = High)
then Risk Eﬀect = High
(iii) Defuzzification. Finally, we build another member-
ship function to represent the diﬀerent possibilities
identified by the risk assessment, as displayed in
Figure 7(d). This process is called defuzzification.
Two of the most common techniques are the centroid
method and maximum method. In the centroid
method, the crisp value of the output variable is
computed by finding the center of gravity of the
membership function. In the maximum method, the
crisp value of the output variable is the maximum
truth value (membership weight) of the fuzzy subset.
The defuzzification technique that is used for this
model is the centroid method.
4. Results
4.1. Risk Assessment. Table 15 shows the results of the risk
assessment method for some risks (which were extracted
based on Table 10). In this table, the asset values, vulnera-
bility eﬀects, and threat eﬀects were calculated with formulas
(2), (3) and (4) and the risk eﬀects were calculated based on
these three previous values and the fuzzy model.
4.2. SUP Framework. To verify the eﬃciency of the proposed
model, it has been implemented in two industrial organiza-
tions. They both had implemented ISMS based on ISO27001
three years ago but lost its continuity after seven months.
The goal was to reimplement ISMS in these organizations but
using the SUP method instead. After waiting seven months,
it was possible to make a meaningful comparison between
the status of this implementation and the one they had
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Table 15: Risk assessment results.
Risk ID Asset Value (0–9) Vulnerability eﬀect (0–100) Threat eﬀect (0–9) Risk eﬀect (0–100)
R1 6.92 91.66 6.92 83.6
R2 9 46.66 7.56 83.6
R3 9 46.66 4.8 18.3
R4 9 50 3.08 18.8
R5 9 50 5 19.2
R6 9 60 5 45.6
R7 5.44 63.33 5.48 57.1
R8 5 73.33 2.68 46
R9 9 80 2.92 49.7
R10 9 80 6.92 83.7
Table 16: The comparison between the two methods.
Index no. Index name
Organization 1 Organization 2
ISO 27001 SUP ISO 27001 SUP
1 Monitoring 27 81 36 63
2 Maintenance and continuity 15 61 18 71
3 Reporting 43 60 51 70
4 Customer confidence 50 82 60 73
5 Risk assessment 50 93 50 80
6 Business continuity 48 66 56 49
7 Role segregation 10 96 11 98
8 Configuration and change management 10 40 12 36
Results %32 %72 %37 %67
with ISO27001. The results of these two implementations
are presented in Table 16. The comparison between the two
methods is based on 8 parameters, which are the most
important aspects of the ISMS implementation.
(i) Monitoring. This aspect ensures that we established
a framework to monitor roles, responsibilities, new
assets, security policies and continuity of the execu-
tive committee of the organization.
(ii) Maintenance and Continuity. This aspect ensures that
our Information Security Management System will
not lose its stability over time. Continuity is one
of the biggest challenges that all security managers
deal with, because we have to consider security
in all business processes, and it needs perfect risk
assessment and management over time.
(iii) Reporting. This aspect ensures that we established a
framework for easy and continuous reporting.
(iv) Customer Confidence. customers expect their infor-
mation to be secure and private. If we implement
a powerful ISMS mechanism, we can improve cus-
tomer confidence. For this purpose, we have to
determine some indicators.
(v) Risk Assessment. This aspect makes sure that our risk
assessment model identifies high risks and prioritizes
them properly. Obviously, it helps us more accurately
reduce risks in the risk management step. Also, it
makes sure that we have good asset classification. As
mentioned, asset classification plays a very important
role in information security management. If we can
classify assets properly, it will help us to achieve an
eﬀective asset protection.
(vi) Business Continuity. It makes sure that our business
continuity management process prevents business
disruptions and security failures and ensure that
essential operations are restored as quickly as possible
[2].
(vii) Role Segregation. It makes sure that we establish a
framework where we can easily segregate security
roles and responsibilities. Proper segregation helps
other aspects of the ISMS implementation.
(viii) Configuration and Change Management. This aspect
ensures that adapting to change, controlling change,
and eﬀecting change are under control. In ISMS, we
have many security documents or policies that are
related to each other, and changing a document is a
challenge.
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Each value in the aspect columns indicates the average
of the top managers’ opinions that have been gathered (all
values are rounded up). Results show that SUP improves
the ISMS implementation. The most impressive part of
the results was shown in maintenance and continuity, role
segregation, and risk assessment, because there is rarely
success without iterative and incremental mechanisms. Also,
significant improvements in other parameters cannot be
ignored.
5. Conclusion
ISO27001 is the best framework to implement and maintain
an organization’s security. The most important point in
this standard is that external certification of ISO27001 does
not mean that you are really secure; it only means that
you are managing security in line with the standard. On
the other hand, ISO27001 points out methods for risk
assessment and choosing controls and policies, but it never
addresses the relations between all these parts as a well-
designed integrated structure for security specialists. The
results obtained clearly demonstrate the benefits of imple-
menting the SUP framework to implement an ISMS. SUP has
eﬀectively improved the ISO27001 implementation process.
Using the SUP framework within an organization leads to
a better and higher-quality ISMS implementation. Eﬀective
management, increased success of the ISMS implementation,
and well-defined tasks for each person who has a role
in the ISMS implementation are precisely identified. One
of the most important parts to ensure an eﬀective ISMS
implementation is the classification of assets, for which the
security cube is proposed in the SUP method. To bring
the organization to a certain security level, an incremental
and iterative process has been designed. Therefore, security
levels are divided into N levels, and by achieving each
one, the organization will reach the desired security. For
each of these levels, or iteration, there is a workflow of
designs. SUP have been implemented in two industrial
organizations, and its results have been compared with the
previous implementation status of ISMS. The results show
the significant improvement in evaluation indicators.
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